























The Economics of Geographical Indications: Welfare Implications  
 
Abstract: The debate over the “right way” of protecting geographical indicators (GIs) has 
resulted in a growing body of literature investigating the welfare effects of GI policies using 
economic  modelling  approaches.  This  paper  presents  a  synthesis  of  a  small  yet  growing 
number  of  analytical  studies  on  GIs.  We  find  that  modelling  results  and  related  policy 
conclusions  hinge  on  different  assumptions  regarding  consumer  preferences,  quality 
differentiation and weights attributed to producer or consumer welfare measures. Inconclusive 
results  regarding  a  pareto-optimal  design  of  GI  policy  leave  several  unresolved  issues  to 
researchers and policy makers assigned with the welfare implications of GI-based market 
interventions. 
Résumé: Le débat sur la meilleure façon de protéger les indicateurs géographiques (IG) a fait 
émerger une litérature en rapide progression ciblant les effets des IG sur bien être de la société 
calculés à partir de diverses approches de modélisation.  Ce manuscrit fait une synthèse des 
études analytiques portant sur les IG.  Nous avançons que  les résultats et conclusions dérivés 
des modèles sont sensibles aux hypothèses quant aux préférences des consommateurs, à la 
différenciation des produits/modélisation de la qualité et aux poids des mesures de surplus des 
consommateurs et des producteurs dans la fonction objective du gouvernement,  Les résultats 
non concluants en ce qui a trait à l’élaboration d’une politique IG Pareto-optimale laissent 
plusieurs questions portant sur les effets des interventions gouvernementales sans réponse.        2
Introduction 
Consumer uncertainty about product quality is a fundamental feature of many agri-
foods markets. It is therefore not surprising that the legislation of Geographical Indications 
(GIs), aimed at providing credible information on the origin of foodstuffs to the public, has 
received considerable attention in the economic literature. However, a growing body of policy 
and more analytically oriented papers agree upon that GIs stand at a “…fine line between the 
organized cartelization in the public interest and undue barriers to entry set by a small group 
of producers” (Bureau and Valceschini 2003).  
GIs are currently protected in 167 countries and their different regulatory approaches 
have raised questions about “the right way” of protection (Giovannucci et al. 2009). The 
United States, Canada, Australia and South Africa use certification marks as well as collective 
marks, which are special categories of the general trademark system, to protect geographical 
origin names.
1 In contrast, sui generis GI protection systems, which are grounded in Roman 
law, can be found in the EU (EU regulation No. 510/2006) and several Asian and Latin 
American countries (i.e., Vietnam, Mongolia, Colombia, Costa Rica) (WIPO 2007). The EU 
considers GIs as an integral part of its food quality policy with the objectives of protecting 
consumers against fraud, fostering rural development and securing cultural and biological 
diversity. In contrast, the U.S. trademark system views GIs primarily as intellectual property 
rights  (IPRs)  that  can  be  used  by  individual  producers  to  enhance  their  competitiveness 
(Giovannucci et al. 2009).These fundamental differences in viewpoints and regulations have 
drawn attention from policy makers and economists alike.  
This paper provides a review of selected economic models used to analyze the welfare 
implications of alternative regulatory approaches. Our main focus is to investigate whether 
and to what extent these economic models have contributed to a better understanding of the 
welfare implications of existing GI policies. And more importantly, if and to what extent 
existing modelling efforts can be applied to advance the current policy debate on GIs.    3
The existing literature relies on rather different model assumptions with respect to GI 
quality and producers’ ability to control supply. These differences in assumptions are often 
crucial to the derivation of welfare impacts and related policy conclusions. Moreover, an 
optimal design of GI policy hinges on the weighting of welfare gains arising from reduced 
information costs against the possible welfare losses due to restrictive regulations and reduced 
competition.  In  such  a  setting  an  optimal  design  of  policy  seems  especially  difficult  to 
achieve.  
However,  questions  surrounding  a  more  efficient  design  of  GI  policy  are  highly 
relevant  to the re-orientation  of the EU’s food and  GI  policy frameworks  as well as the 
growing interest in local and authentic food systems in the United States. The regulatory 
framework on GIs is also frequently addressed in bilateral trade agreements between the EU 
and third-party countries, such as Australia and Canada.
2  
At the same time a growing number economic analyses of GIs have developed into 
streams that not only differ in their methodological approach, but also appear to be divided 
over the issue itself. This makes a comprehensive economic analysis of GIs a challenging task 
(Herrmann and Teuber forthcoming). In particular, formal economic analyses and case studies 
seem  to  be  disconnected  from  each  other  when  drawing  conclusions  about  the  welfare 
implications of GIs.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  highlights  the  economic 
rationale  for  policy  interventions  in  the case  of  GIs  and  briefly  discusses  the  differences 
between  EU  and  U.S.  style  GI  systems.  Section  3  presents  an  analytical  review  of  the 
economic  modelling  literature  on  GI  certification  schemes.  In  section  4,  we  discuss  the 
findings and policy conclusions with regards to the current policy discussion on GIs and an 
outlook on future research. We specifically focus on the question whether the EU system of 
GI protection is effective in overcoming consumer information asymmetries and an efficient 
instrument from a social welfare perspective.    4
Geographical Indications – Information Asymmetries, Market Failure and 
Regulatory Systems 
Information Asymmetries, Market Failure and Governmental Intervention 
The essential feature of a GI is the link between a product’s geographical origin and its 
quality, reputation or other characteristics derived from its origin - generally referred to as 
quality-origin  nexus  or  terroir  (TRIPs,  Art.  22.1).  Terroir,  the  French  term  for  “taste  of 
place”, stands for a causal relationship between agronomic conditions, craftsmanship and a 
product’s distinct quality (Giovannucci et al. 2009). 
Terroir and, hence, geographical origin presents as a credence attribute typical not 
verifiable  by  consumers.  However,  if  an  origin-quality  link  results  in  a  distinguishable 
sensory  quality,  origin  can  become an  experience attribute. In any case, without credible 
labelling consumers cannot infer whether a product truly originates from a proclaimed region 
or whether a given GI claim is fraudulent. This prevalence of asymmetric information has 
been shown to have important implications for market performance and may result in multiple 
market equilibria (Spence 2002). For instance, an equilibrium in which producers set a unique 
price (pooling equilibrium) may exist if qualities are exogenous, the share of low quality 
producers  is  small  and  the  costs  of  signalling  are  high  (ibidem).  In  this  case  the  mere 
observation of the price does not provide any information about the quality to consumers. 
Another possible market outcome is that of Akerlof’s (1970) well-known “lemons” problem 
where only low quality products might be offered; a typical problem of “one-shot” purchases. 
For instance, olive oil producers may have a strong incentive to cut quality when facing 
tourists who will likely buy their olive oil only once and will not punish them in subsequent 
periods.  One  possible  solution  to  increase  product  quality  in  typical  “one-shot”  purchase 
situations are: (i) reliable certification labels and/or (ii) informed buyers that exert a positive 
externality on uninformed buyers.
3 In a repeated purchase setting, however, where consumers 
learn about desired product attributes after purchase, producers can establish a reputation for   5
quality via brands. Still, no government intervention is required besides the provision of a 
functioning  regulatory  system.  Although  “one-shot”  purchases  have  some  relevance  for 
certain GI products, repeat purchase markets seem to prevail in most GI cases.  
Consequently, GIs act very much in the same manner as brands or other certification 
labels which aim at overcoming the market failure induced by information asymmetry. By 
implementing  a  credible  certification  scheme,  the  geographical  origin  turns  into  a  search 
attribute  to  consumers  and  a  new  equilibrium  evolves  (Crespi  and  Marette  2003). 
Consequently,  GI  labelling  can  lower  consumer’s  search  cost  while  at  the  same  time 
providing incentives for producers to invest in consistent quality production in order to build a 
reputation (Ragnekar 2004, Bramley, Biénabe and Kirsten 2009).  
However,  there  exist  situations  where  further  government  intervention  may  be 
justified. Josling (2006) argues that a regional public good problem might arise due to the 
collective nature of a GI. If fixed costs of setting up a credible quality certification scheme are 
prohibitively  high  for  individual  producers,  a  governmental  agency  that  benefits  from 
economies  of  scale  can  ensure  that  the  product  is  marketed  after  all;  a  well-established 
argument  in  the  economic  theory  of  public  and  club  goods  (Cornes  and  Sandler  1996). 
Externalities which lead to a suboptimal market outcome can be internalized by governmental 
interventions  in  terms  of  subsidies  or  taxes  in  order  to  improve  market  efficiency.  Even 
though collective action by producers may enhance total social welfare, this might not be 
realized without government intervention due to the fact that individual producers do not 
include consumers’ surplus in their production decisions. Collective action is not a specific 
feature  of  GIs;  in  fact  it  has  a  long  tradition  in  agricultural  markets.  Though  explicit 
cooperation among sellers violates antitrust laws, in many countries there are exemptions for 
farmers (Sexton and Lavoie 2001). This is often based on the “competitive yardstick effect” 
which implies that in a situation with imperfect competition allowing farmers to collude and 
act collectively will have a pro-competitive influence on the market (ibidem). The underlying   6
idea  is  that  collective  action,  e.g.,  through  a  cooperative,  can  countervail  upstream  or 
downstream market power, thereby strengthening the farmers’ position in the supply chain. 
This  is  a  well-established  argument  for  governmental  support  of  cooperatives  and  their 
exemptions from antitrust laws (Bergman 1997). A similar justification can be applied to GIs, 
with  one  important  difference;  Sexton  and  Lavoie  (2001)  highlight  that  cooperatives  are 
usually ill-suited to exercise market power, because membership is voluntary and there is 
seldom  a  single  cooperative  controlling  the  complete  market  supply  of  a  product. 
Alternatively,  once  a  GI  is  registered  the  producer  organization controls  the total  market 
supply of that particular GI product, at least in the region where the legislation applies. The 
debate over the potential trade-off between enabling agricultural producers to protect their 
products  and  reputation  against  deception  and  the  granting  of  market  power  to  producer 
groups is at the centre of the GI debate (Bureau and Valceschini 2003).  
Regulatory Systems 
Two systems of GI protection have emerged over time: (i) the EU-style sui generis 
system and (ii) a trademark-based system. Though both schemes enable producers to provide 
information about their product in order to overcome the possibility of consumer confusion 
due to asymmetric information, there are some noteworthy differences.  
The EU system distinguishes between protected designations of origin (PDOs) and 
protected geographical indications (PGIs) according to the strength of the required origin-
quality link. In the case of a PDO, all stages of production must take place in the defined area, 
whereas in the case of a PGI it suffices that one stage of the production process is carried out 
in the defined area (European Commission 2007). Applicants to the EU’s sui generis system 
are required to provide proof of the production history and the unique quality-origin link 
which must be accompanied by a detailed product specification. Once a product is registered 
the producer organization qualifies for EU support in terms of promoting GI labelled products 
to consumers as well as legal services in infringement cases. In contrast, protection through   7
certification marks granted under U.S. trademark law can be obtained without qualifications 
and  only  serves  commercial  purposes  without  additional  governmental  involvement. 
Consequently, EU-style GIs can be considered as club goods with governmental support, 
whereas GI-like certification marks protected under trademark law are considered as club 
goods with no or little governmental support (Thiedig and Sylvander 2000). 
To summarize, trademark-based certification marks differ from sui generis GIs in that 
(i) they are not required to meet any predefined public or private minimum quality standards, 
(ii) they are not necessarily linked to a specified geographical origin, and (iii) the rules of 
participation  are  solely  defined  by  their  owner  (Giovannucci  et  al.  2009).  However,  the 
quality standard that is ensured under EU-style sui generis systems has  first been set by 
producer organizations themselves.
4 
  Another EU certification scheme related to GIs that has received little attention in the 
literature is the Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) scheme.
5 In contrast to GIs, TSG are 
not linked to a specific geographical area but they certify a traditional composition or way of 
production. Largely underused by producers, TSG are similar to trademarks in the sense that 




Welfare Analysis of GIs  
In this section we first describe the theoretical modelling frameworks used in major GI 
contributions. Second, we focus on the welfare implications of these different contributions.  
Theoretical Modelling Approaches  
There exist numerous case studies that analyze consumers’ attitudes, perceptions and 
willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  for  GI  labelled  products  (van  der  Lans  et  al.  2001;  Scarpa 
Philippidis and Spalatro 2005; van Ittersum et al. 2007) and GI producers marketing strategies 
(Belletti et al. 2009; Mora and Menozzi 2009). Studies on consumers indicate that preferences   8
and WTP for GI products are generally driven by two dimensions: a quality dimension and a 
support-warranty dimension (van Ittersum et al. 2007). The first dimension refers to the fact 
that most consumers expect GI products to be of a higher quality than non-GI products. The 
second one implies that consumers prefer domestic over foreign products, which is often 
referred to as “consumer ethnocentrism.” Consumers express strong preferences for domestic 
products based on an affinity to their home region and the wish to support domestic producers 
(Lusk et al. 2006). Other consumer studies find that certain consumer segments attach a value 
to GI products because of their contribution to secure biological and cultural diversity, i.e., 
tradition and authenticity seem to be important product attributes (Teuber forthcoming).   
Apart from a more marketing-oriented literature which mainly focuses on estimating 
consumers’ willingness to pay for certified origin-labelled foods (e.g. Loureiro and Umberger 
2003),  a  small  yet  emerging  literature  analyzes  the  welfare  implications  of  current  GI 
regulatory schemes on producers and consumers. Research questions that have been tackled 
include  self-regulation  and  collective  action  (Langinier  and  Babcock  2008;  Zago  1999), 
collusion and supply control (Zago and Pick 2004; Lence et al. 2007; Mérel 2009), collective 
reputation (Winfree and McCluskey 2005; Menapace and Moschini 2010), and quality-related 
issues  (Desquilbet and Monier-Dilhan 2008;  Saitone and Sexton 2009; Mérel and Sexton 
2010).  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  only  a  few  studies  explicitly  address  the  welfare 
implications of different GI certification systems (Lence et al. 2007; Bouamra-Mechemache 
and Chaaban 2010; Menapace and Moschini 2010). Despite the common finding that thet EU 
and U.S. GI systems are not equivalent in terms of their welfare effects, these contributions 
differ in their modeling approaches, findings and derived policy recommendations.  
The main contributions and findings of selected economic analyses of GI certification 
schemes are presented in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 summarizes studies that investigate the 
welfare impact of GI regulation compared to a situation with no regulation. The system of   9
protection itself is not addressed in these contributions. A comparison of different GI systems 
is explicitly included in the studies presented in table 2.  
<Insert tables 1 and 2> 
The argument of high fixed costs of establishing a GI product and the related potential 
market  failure  is  discussed  in  several  contributions  (Lence  et  al.  2007  and  Moschini, 
Menapace and Pick 2008). Fixed costs usually occur in the form of registration costs. In 
general, fixed costs should also include research and development costs. However, in the 
context of GIs, these costs were borne by producers in previous periods and thus are already 
sunk which implies that they do not enter the analysis. 
Assumptions concerning the market structure and supply side conditions differ across 
these studies. In most of the papers, imperfect competition is assumed and research questions 
address either the optimal club size (Langinier and Babcock 2008) or the profit-maximizing 
choice of quality by a producers organization (Mérel and Sexton 2010). Exceptions are the 
contributions of Menapace and Moschini (2010) and Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008) 
where perfect competition with free entry and exit is assumed. Yet, none of these assumptions 
seem unrealistic. Indeed, there are so many different GI products that, for each scenario, there 
is at least one real-world GI example that can justify the chosen assumptions (see tables 1 and 
2).  
With respect to the demand side, most of these studies use a model of vertical product 
differentiation, where quality is the considered attribute. Consequently, consumer preferences 
are modelled as preferences over quality 
(1)  p s U − =θ , 
where s is the level of quality, θ represents the taste for quality and p the price. It is assumed 
that consumers’ value quality, i.e., Us > 0, and that consumers with higher values of θ value 
quality more, i.e., Uθ > 0. In most cases, two quality levels are considered, with consumers 
buying a high-quality good (i.e., the GI product), a low-quality good (i.e., the generic product)   10
or  nothing  at  all.  The  only  exception  is  in  Desquillbet  and  Monier-Dilhan  (2008)  where 
consumers value origin per se, and have the following preference function 
(2)  p label rInd s U − + = ) ( θ     
where r is a preference parameter for regional origin and Ind(label) an indicator that takes the 
value 1 if the good is labelled as a GI and 0 otherwise.
7 It is assumed that all consumers have 
identical preferences for the regional origin but differ in their taste for quality. Moreover, 
consumers’ utility is additive in the two attributes.  
Even though all these studies rely on a model of vertical differentiation, some of them 
differ in their treatment of the distribution of consumers. In most contributions a uniform 
distribution of consumers with respect to their taste for quality (i.e., the distribution of θ 
within the population) is assumed, which implies that the fraction of consumers with low 
WTP  for  quality  equals  the  fraction  of  consumers  with  high  WTP  for  quality.
8  This 
assumption  is relaxed in Mérel and  Sexton (2010)  in which several consumer preference 
distributions are considered. They argue that it is most likely that the fraction of consumers 
with low or intermediate WTP for GI products is larger than the fraction of consumers with 
high WTP. Hence, consumer clustering at the lower end of the quality spectrum is introduced. 
Menapace  and  Moschini  (2010)  also  consider  different  preference  structures  in  order  to 
investigate  how  the  structure  of  demand  influences  the  welfare  implications  for  both 
producers and consumers.  
 
Welfare and Policy Implications 
Some of these contributions argue that quantity collusion might be a necessary evil to 
solve the market failure that arises from high fixed costs of establishing a GI (Zago and Pick 
2004, Lence et al. 2007). Though allowing collusion may increase welfare, granting too much 
market power to producers will reduce it. Hence, in these contributions an optimal level of 
collusion  that  maximizes  total  welfare  can  be  derived.  On  the  other  hand,  Moschini,   11
Menapace and Pick (2008) show that collusion will not enhance but reduce welfare, since 
collusion will decrease the high-quality production, which is already suboptimal, even further. 
They also consider a scenario in which some production factors (e.g., land) are in scarce 
supply. In such a setting, GI certification can benefit producers due to returns generated by 
these scarce production factors. However, in the absence of scarce inputs, producers will not 
benefit from a GI certification at all. In Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008), the major 
beneficiaries are consumers. They also show that the competitive market equilibrium is not 
Pareto  efficient,  a  result  well-known  whenever  information  is  imperfect  and  markets  are 
incomplete (Stiglitz 2000). It is argued that in the case of GIs the failure of the competitive 
equilibrium to deliver the first-best outcome is caused by high fixed costs of marketing and 
promotion.  In  such  a  situation  government  interventions  (taxes  or  subsidies)  can  lead  to 
Pareto  improvements  (Moschini,  Menapace  and  Pick  2008).  According  to  this  argument, 
financial support granted by the EU to member countries to promote GI certification labels 
(both  in  the  internal  market  and  in  third-party  countries)  can  contribute  to  the  efficient 
provision of high-quality agri-food products.  
Concerning the differences between the U.S. and EU GI systems, Lence et al. (2007) 
argue that ex post (i.e., conditional on the GI system being already established), the U.S. 
system leads to higher deadweight losses than the EU system. This finding is based on the 
assumption  that  the  U.S.  system  leads  to  larger  technological  inefficiencies,  because  it 
provides  fewer  instruments  to  directly  control  supply.  This  creates  incentives  to  distort 
production  practices  to  limit  supply.  These  indirect  forms  of  collusion,  e.g.,  input  and 
production requirements, lead to large production inefficiencies and society may be better off 
by  allowing  producers  to  collude  directly.  This  line  of  argument  is  questioned  by  Mérel 
(2009). His analysis highlights that indirect ways of colluding lead to smaller deadweight 
losses than direct ones (see Annex 1). His results are driven by the assumption that in the case   12
of indirect collusion practices output prices are less distorted, leading to a smaller loss in 
consumer surplus compared to pure collusion on output.  
With respect to consumer surplus, Menapace and Moschini (2010) conclude that (i) a 
sui generis system is more beneficial for consumers with a strong preference for quality, (ii) a 
certification  mark  based  system  favours  consumers  with  an  intermediate  preference  for 
quality,  and  (iii)  the  EU  sui  generis  system  outweighs  the  U.S.  certification  mark-based 
system, since it ensures a higher quality level of GI products. Accordingly, a major result of 
their study is that the consumer demand structure determines which system provides larger 
welfare gains. With respect to the producer side, Menapace and Moschini (2010) find that 
producers do not benefit at all or are even harmed by a GI certification scheme. In this context 
they distinguish between ex post and ex ante evaluation of GI certification systems. Ex ante, 
i.e., before any investment in reputation has taken place, producers neither benefit nor lose 
from the introduction of a GI certification system. In contrast, producers who have already 
invested in reputation (e.g., well-known brands) might be harmed by the introduction of a GI 
certification (ex post analysis). This result is closely related to the findings of Crespi (2007) 
and Crespi and Marette (2002) who analyze the effects of generic advertising on product 
differentiation.  If  generic  advertising  or  a  GI  certification  scheme  reduces  the  perceived 
product differences within a producer group, high-quality producers may lose market shares 
to lower-quality producers.  
 
Discussion and future research 
Because the economic literature on GIs does not provide clear guidance in terms of 
policy implications, the task of policy makers in deciding the appropriate regulation of GIs is 
not easy. Some questions need to be clarified: Which economic model should be favoured? 
What policy implications seem more relevant?   13
In this last section we discuss the relevance of modelling frameworks, of some of the 
assumptions  and  results.  Based  on  the  existing  models  and  their  findings,  we  attempt  to 
provide direction for future research when we believe there is a need to fill a gap.  
First, restricting output via product specifications and allowing producers to collude 
must always be weighed against possible welfare losses due to less competition in the market. 
Though conceptually it should be possible to determine the optimal levels of information and 
protection, in practice the situation is more complex and in most of the theoretical studies 
presented above this problem is assumed away. This is fully in line with a conclusion by Fink 
and Maskus (2006) who state that it may be difficult to strike an optimal balance between 
consumer needs and producer gains in designing GIs, a well-known problem in the design of 
IP tools in general. The preamble of the EU regulation states that one of the major objectives 
of  the  GI  regulation  is  to  reduce  consumer  search  costs  and  avoid  consumer  confusion. 
Considering the present EU GI system from this perspective, exclusive rights attached to a GI 
can be overly strong if they exclude alternative users that could enter the market and compete 
without confusing consumers. Are consumers really misled and confused by a label stating 
“Feta-style cheese, produced in Denmark”? If they are not, it seems reasonable to infer that 
the current EU GI system is “overprotecting” consumers and domestic producers might be 
able to extract economic rents from this absolute protection level.  
Second,  comparing  different  regulatory  approaches  raises  the  question  of  transfer 
efficiency. This question has been partly addressed by Mérel (2009) who argues that if policy-
makers  can  choose  between  an  output  and  an  input  quota  to  transfer  sufficient  rents  to 
producers to cover fixed costs, the last option should be preferred since it is associated with 
lower welfare costs. These results are especially important given the recent discussion on the 
future of the EU’s food quality policy, particularly the future of the GI and TSG scheme. 
Several GI producer organizations in Europe have asked for more rights to control production, 
e.g., by implementing production quotas (Commission of the European Communities 2009,   14
Fischer Boel 2008). The analysis presented by Mérel (2009) indicates that if policy makers 
allow more control, social welfare would be reduced. Apart from that, the signal arising from 
such policies would be detrimental to the overall goal of lowering agricultural support and 
putting  more  emphasis  on  competitiveness  in  terms  of  quality  instead  of  relying  on 
governmental intervention to secure producers’ income.  
Third, given the empirical evidence about consumers’ attitudes towards GI products, 
the inclusion of origin per se in consumers’ utility function seems to be a promising approach 
to  extend existing  studies.  As  mentioned  before,  consumer  ethnocentrism  or  the  support- 
warranty dimension has been found to be important in consumers’ purchase decision for local 
food  in  general  and  GI  products  in  particular.
9  However,  it  seems  questionable  that  all 
consumers  have  identical  preferences  about  origin  per  se  as  assumed  in  Desquilbet  and 
Monier-Dilhan (2008). It is more likely that only some consumers located inside and outside 
the production area value this attribute, whereas other consumers do not value origin or/and a 
GI label at all. Consumers may even attach a value to a label itself, a phenomenon well-
known for brands. Moreover, the consumer research literature has highlighted that agri-food 
products provide a bundle of product attributes and possess several quality dimensions. Even 
though these different quality attributes might be complementary in most cases, there might 
be trade-off effects as well. These aspects seem to be particularly relevant for the EU claw 
back initiative. The so-called claw back initiative refers to a list of geographical names for 
which the EU wishes to prohibit use by non original producers. Many of the names on this list 
do not  benefit from a GI protection in certain jurisdictions, as they are considered to be 
generic terms falling under the common-language exception of the TRIPS Agreement (Fink 
and Maskus 2006). Non-EU consumers may have a preference for an original GI product, 
because it is authentic and tastes better, while at the same time they prefer to buy domestically 
produced foods, i.e., a GI-variety or a generic product. In such a setting it is unlikely that the 
vertical product differentiation requirement will hold, i.e., all consumers agree on a clear   15
ranking of products if offered at the same price. It seems more reasonable to assume that the 
original GI product and the domestically produced GI variety are horizontally differentiated, 
since some consumers prefer the domestic one while others prefer the original product. The 
crucial point in the discussion on the EU claw back initiative is to know whether the costs of 
re-naming and re-labelling domestic products that producers have to bear can be offset by the 
increase in consumers’ welfare due to this policy. 
Fourth,  another  interesting  point  addressed  in  the  study  of  Bottega,  Delacote  and 
Ibanez (2009) on voluntary quality labels is to understand the objective pursued by a third-
party certifier. They distinguish between a wide public policy, in which the demand for the 
high-quality product is maximized, and a global quality policy, in which the overall quality of 
the market is maximized. This seems closely related to understanding whether the EU GI 
system provides too much quality, which is whether the product quality level provided by the 
regulation exceeds the quality level that maximizes societal welfare (Mérel and Sexton 2010). 
Their results are especially interesting if considered jointly with the results of Menapace and 
Moschini (2010). The findings of the latter are driven by the assumption that the EU GI 
system  provides  higher-quality  products  than  a  US-style  system  due  to  stricter  product 
requirements. This can be true, but it does not have to be. There exist examples of U.S. 
certification marks which have strict product and process requirements in order to ensure a 
high-quality (e.g., Vidalia onions). The fact that in the U.S. producers are free to choose their 
quality  requirements  can  lead  to  a  situation  in  which  producers  establish  even  stricter 
requirements than those necessary to provide a certain quality level. Following the argument 
of Mérel and Sexton (2010), this might result in an excess in quality compared to the socially 
optimal level. Though Mérel and Sexton (2010) do not explicitly analyze the U.S. system, 
their model set-up can be used to infer that the EU system outperforms the U.S. certification 
system in terms of social welfare, since it is more regulated and producers are not totally free 
to  choose  their  product  specifications.  In  other  words,  the  strict  EU  regulations  inhibit   16
producers from choosing product specifications that only restrict supply without improving 
quality which would result in even more excess of quality. Accordingly, the conclusion to 
favour an EU sui generis system over a certification mark system would be confirmed with 
both model approaches. However, the underlying reasons are totally different. In Menapace 
and Moschini (2010) the EU system is favoured because it provides higher quality, whereas in 
Mérel and Sexton (2010) it is because it leads to a reduction of the excessive quality relative 
to the social optimum. 
To summarize, both systems seem to be effective in terms of overcoming the market 
failure caused by information asymmetry. However, the efficiency of both systems remains an 
open question. Is there overregulation to the benefit of producers or do consumers attach such 
a strong value to these products that absolute protection as granted under the EU regulation 
and the governmental support in suing free-riders can be justified from a societal welfare 
perspective?  Is  there  a  regional  public  good  involved  so  that  private  regulations  do  not 
suffice?  These  questions  are  still  not  fully  answered  and  will  remain  major  points  in 
discussions on the right way to protect GIs. Other aspects that have not been included in 
theoretical models so far are the more diffuse objectives of protecting biodiversity, traditional 
knowhow  and  authenticity.  The  empirical  evidence  from  GI  case  studies  is  rather 
inconclusive; both positive and negative cases have been reported in case study contributions 
(Herrmann and Teuber 2010). To what extent GI regulation supports issues surrounding the 
protecting  of  biodiversity,  traditional  knowledge,  or  authenticity  still  needs  to  be  further 
analyzed to address the efficiency of GI policy instruments in supporting these goals. 
 
 
                                                
1 A certification mark refers to a ‘word, symbol, name or device’ used by someone other than the owner of the 
certification mark to certify certain product characteristics, such as the geographical origin or certain processing 
practices. Certification marks are typically owned by governmental institutions.   17
                                                                                                                                                   
2 A discussion of the role of GIs in international trade policy can be found in Fink and Maskus (2006). 
3 Informed buyers are for example the readership of reviews or consumer reports. However, it has been shown 
by Mahenc (2004) that informed buyers are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to resolve the lemons 
problem.  
4 The choice of the appropriate product specification is often a crucial point in the application process. There are 
several examples in which applications were not submitted because producers could not agree on one product 
specification or subgroups emerged that did not join the GI producer group (Tregear et al. 2007).   
5 For more detailed information see EC regulation No. 509/2006 and 510/2006.  
6 In the recent consultation on the future of the EU’s agricultural quality policy it was discussed to abolish the 
TSG scheme due to the very low utilization rate. Since its establishment in 1992, only 30 products have been 
registered compared to over 800 PDO/PGI products. However, the European Parliament (2010) recommends to 
keep this instrument and to simplify the rules for registration in order to make it more attractive to producers. 
7 This indicator is included because origin is a credence attribute and can only be revealed by public labelling. At 
the same time this specification implies that the utility functions are identical whether consumers care for origin 
or the label itself. 
8 This distribution is often adopted for tractability reasons. 
9  Consumer  ethnocentrism  and  support-warranty  dimension  are  closely  connected  but  not  equal.  Consumer 
ethnocentrism does always imply that products from the home region or home country are preferred, whereas the 
support-warranty dimension can also mean that foreign products are preferred over domestic ones, e.g. fair trade 
products.   18
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Table 1: Overview of the analytical literature comparing the situations GI Regulation vs. No regulation 
 
Authors  Model Assumptions 
Market Structure 
Real-world examples 
Results / Welfare Impacts  Policy Implications 
Zago and 
Pick (2004) 
Quality is exogenous, 
GI production is costlier,  
FC of certification borne by high-
quality producers  
(i)  PC 
(ii)  MP  
 
High-quality producers clearly benefit; Ambiguous 
welfare impacts on consumers and total welfare 
depending on the magnitude of administrative costs, 
quality differences and degree of supply control  
Particular care should be given to 
the analysis of the degree of 




and Pick  
(2008) 
Quality is endogenous,  
GI production is costlier, 
FC and variable monitoring costs on 
a per-output basis borne by high-
quality producers,  
(i)  PC  
(ii)  PC with scarce 
inputs 
Italian olive oil and wine 
GIs 
GIs can support the competitive provision of quality 
and lead to clear welfare gains. Consumers are the 
main beneficiaries, whereas producer surplus 
depends on the presence of scarce factors that they 
own. However, the competitive equilibrium is not 
Pareto efficient, because it under provides the high-
quality good. 
The competitive equilibrium fails to 
provide the first-best outcome due 
to external economies at the 
industry level. This failure can be 
corrected by certification subsidies. 




Quality is exogenous,  
MC of production are zero,  
GIs are club goods 
(i)  No certification  
(ii)  Full revelation 
certification regime 
(iii)  Partial revelation 
regime 
Level of certification costs determine whether the 
gains to high-quality producers offset the losses to 
low-quality producer; both consumers with high and 
low WTP gain from certification:  
There may be overprovision of 
labels compared to what is socially 





PO chooses the product specification 
that maximizes aggregate profits; 
Supply control increases quality; 
MC increase faster than AC when 
quality increases 
PO as Monopoly  
Comté cheese 
Profit-maximizing choice of the GI quality by a PO 
will generally exceed the quality level that 
maximizes social welfare 
EU regulation is likely to produce 
excessive quality. 
AC = Average Costs, FC = Fixed Costs, MC = Marginal Costs, MP = Market Power, FC=Fixed Costs, LR = Land Restrictions, PC = Perfect Competition, PO = Producer 
Organization, SC= Supply Control. 
Source: Own presentation.    25
Table 2: Overview of the analytical literature comparing different GI systems 
 
Authors  Model Assumptions  Considered Scenarios 
Real-world examples 
Results / Welfare Impacts  Policy Implications 
Lence et al. 
(2007) 
Quality is exogenous,  
FC of certification borne by high-
quality producers 
(i)  PC - Idahoe potatoes 
(ii)  Monopoly - Benchmark 
(iii)  SC via LR - Lentils from 
Castellucio di Norcia 
(iv)  SC via PS - U.S. marketing 
orders 
(v)     SC via LR and PS  - Brunello 
di Montalcino wine 
If FC of development is high, allowing producers to 
collude can enhance social welfare, since the 
benefits from consuming the high-quality good may 
outweigh the losses. 
Both from the producer and the societal perspective 
the EU system is more favourable than the US 
system. 
The EU rules dominate the US 
system in terms of ex ante 
societal surplus, since the latter 
one leads to large technical 
distortions due to fewer 






GI region, non-GI region  
One producer in each region 
Demand side: gustatory quality and 
origin   
(i)  No labelling 
(ii)  Binding labelling 
(iii)  Non-binding labelling 
 






Quality is endogenous,  
Comparative advantage of the GI 
technology in the upper-quality 
range, free entry/exit 
(i)  TM only,  
(ii)  TM plus sui generis system 
(iii) TM plus CM system with 
(without) QR 
 
Welfare gains depend on the distribution of 
consumer types. Since a sui generis system lowers 
prices in the upper part of the quality spectrum, it 
favours consumers with high values of θ. Ex post 
introduction is only desirable, if consumer gains are 
larger than the losses in reputation of established 
brands. 
Sui generis schemes generally 
disclose more information than 






GI labels involve technological 
constraints which impose higher 
variable costs of production. 
Private common labels only require 
FC (R&D expenses); 
(i)  Public certification  
PDO Brie 
(ii) Collective private common 
label 
Collective TM 
Efficiency of the GI label compared to a private 
label depends on the interplay between the variable 
production costs under a GI regime and the fixed 
costs of the private label. Production capacity 
constraints and higher variable costs related to a GI 
Even if GIs are efficient from a 
producer perspective, a society 
might be better off with less 
stringent techniques of quality 
signalling, relying on private   26
Endogenous quality choice  system should play  central role in the welfare 
analysis of GIs 
collective certification. 
 
Notes: AC = Average Costs, CM= Certification Mark, FC = Fixed Costs, MC = Marginal Costs, MP = Market Power, FC=Fixed Costs, LR = Land Restrictions, PC = Perfect 
Competition, PD=Price Discrimination, PO = Producer Organization, PDO = Protected Designation of Origin, PS = Product Specification, QR = Quality Requirements, SC= 
Supply Control, TM = Trademark, WTP = Willingness to pay; n.s. not specified.  
Source: Own presentation.   27
Annex 1: Miscellaneous studies on GI regulations  
Authors  Model Assumptions  Considered Scenarios  Results / Welfare Impacts  Policy Implications 
Transfer Efficiency (Input vs Output Quotas) 
Mérel (2009)  Both policies generate sufficient 
rents to cover fixed costs.  
(i)  Output quota 
(ii)  Input quota 
Provided that both policies generate sufficient 
rents to cover fixed costs, an input quota is 
socially preferable to a producer-optimal output 
quota. 
The request by several POs in the 
ongoing reorganization of the EU’s 
agricultural policy to strengthen 
their ability to control supply 
directly should be evaluated on the 
presented findings.  
Economics of the Claw-Back Initative   
Benavente 
(2010) 
Two countries: Home – Foreign 
Three varieties: Foreign GI-original 
good, Home GI-variety good, 
generics 
Consumers value the GI label and 
the origin per se 
Only equilibrium at home is 
analyzed  
Two regimes: 
(i) GI taken as generic 
(ii) GI protected as IPR 
Two scenarios for foreign firms: 
(i)  Fringe of Competitiors 
(ii)  Monopolistic Competition 
 
There might be a potential global welfare gain of 
the claw-back initiative if the valuation for 
variety is low and the valuation of origin is high.   
However, consumers with a low WTP for origin 
and a high valuation of the GI-variety are the 
major losers.  
 
Industrialized countries with 
sophisticated consumers and high 
relative costs of production tend to 
lose less from protecting foreign 
GIs than developing countries with 
less sophisticated consumers and 
lower relative costs. 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
 